I am a big fan of Richard Muller and accept his criticism of Jonathan Edwards. I now see where I might be wrong.
Did he commit the modal fallacy?
Did he commit the modal fallacy?
Tuesday, May 12, 2015
Problem of Criterion as a theological key
How do you know? How do you know that you know? This is the problem of criterion, and far from being a technical point in epistemology, it is huge for theology and the life of the church. It runs like this:
How do we decide in any case whether we have knowledge in that case? What are the criteria of knowledge? (Moreland 2007, 123).
To risk a dangerous oversimplification, "How do we know that we know x?" Here is an example. If I tell someone that God gave me a word of knowledge, the cessationist will respond, "Yeah, but how do you know that was from God?"
If I say that I have the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit bearing witness that I am a child of God and destined for heaven, the anchorite will ask, "Yeah, but how do you know that without using your own subjective demon-inspired reason?"
It boils down to this: Before I can legitimately claim knowledge in these areas I must first satisfy the condition of knowing how I know. Seems fair enough and few people challenge this.
But there is a problem. Before I can know anything (say P, representing that I have the internum spiritum sanctum), I must know two other things: Q (my criterion for knowledge, which the critic seeks) and R (the fact that P satisfies Q). But there is no reason to stop here. One can now ask how I know Q and R, to which the new answer is Q' and R'. But now I have to give a reason for Q'' and R''. Further, I must now give a reason for Q''' and R'''.
Said another way: Before I can know, I must know how I know. Before I can know how I know, I must know how I know how I know. And on the nightmare goes.
Best just to dismiss the critic's question. But before that, let's give our own solution. We can start by knowing specific, clear items of knowledge. We can solve the problem of criterion by beginning with particular cases of knowledge and generalising to formulate a criterion for true belief. For example, while I know my faculty of reason can be faulty at times, I had to use the faculty of reason to write that sentence (assuming A = ~~A and that my terms meant what they meant). Using this reason I am able to read texts (and everyone will assume the text is clear at at least one level, otherwise why would you ever appeal to an opponent to read a text like 2 Peter 1:4?). This immediately falsifies the claim that I can't understand a text unless I am already in a community of text (no one seriously believes this when push comes to shove).
Moreland, J. P. Kingdom Triangle. Grand Rapids, Zondervan, 2007.
How do we decide in any case whether we have knowledge in that case? What are the criteria of knowledge? (Moreland 2007, 123).
To risk a dangerous oversimplification, "How do we know that we know x?" Here is an example. If I tell someone that God gave me a word of knowledge, the cessationist will respond, "Yeah, but how do you know that was from God?"
If I say that I have the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit bearing witness that I am a child of God and destined for heaven, the anchorite will ask, "Yeah, but how do you know that without using your own subjective demon-inspired reason?"
It boils down to this: Before I can legitimately claim knowledge in these areas I must first satisfy the condition of knowing how I know. Seems fair enough and few people challenge this.
But there is a problem. Before I can know anything (say P, representing that I have the internum spiritum sanctum), I must know two other things: Q (my criterion for knowledge, which the critic seeks) and R (the fact that P satisfies Q). But there is no reason to stop here. One can now ask how I know Q and R, to which the new answer is Q' and R'. But now I have to give a reason for Q'' and R''. Further, I must now give a reason for Q''' and R'''.
Said another way: Before I can know, I must know how I know. Before I can know how I know, I must know how I know how I know. And on the nightmare goes.
Best just to dismiss the critic's question. But before that, let's give our own solution. We can start by knowing specific, clear items of knowledge. We can solve the problem of criterion by beginning with particular cases of knowledge and generalising to formulate a criterion for true belief. For example, while I know my faculty of reason can be faulty at times, I had to use the faculty of reason to write that sentence (assuming A = ~~A and that my terms meant what they meant). Using this reason I am able to read texts (and everyone will assume the text is clear at at least one level, otherwise why would you ever appeal to an opponent to read a text like 2 Peter 1:4?). This immediately falsifies the claim that I can't understand a text unless I am already in a community of text (no one seriously believes this when push comes to shove).
Moreland, J. P. Kingdom Triangle. Grand Rapids, Zondervan, 2007.
Sunday, May 10, 2015
Theological Pensee, no. 2
"Speech--God of Word, Act, and Promise and not the god of the ontologians."
We do not ascend a ladder to meet God. His Word descended and spoke to us (Romans 10). The above is not a criticism of metaphysics. Logical and metaphysical tools help us refine what we believe about God. We can even make a case for ontotheism if we were so inclined.
Rather, we are attacking chain of being.
We do not ascend a ladder to meet God. His Word descended and spoke to us (Romans 10). The above is not a criticism of metaphysics. Logical and metaphysical tools help us refine what we believe about God. We can even make a case for ontotheism if we were so inclined.
Rather, we are attacking chain of being.
Saturday, May 9, 2015
Where do angels and demons exist?
Angels and demons do not exist in the Bible. They exist in real life. We read about them in the Bible. We encounter them in real life.
Similarly, spiritual warfare happens in real life, not in a text. (Funny how conservative Christians become Derrideans at this point!) 2 Corinthians 10 isn't just saying we need to think Christianly (which we do). It is a spiritual warfare text.
Similarly, spiritual warfare happens in real life, not in a text. (Funny how conservative Christians become Derrideans at this point!) 2 Corinthians 10 isn't just saying we need to think Christianly (which we do). It is a spiritual warfare text.
For though we walk in the flesh, we do not war according to the flesh
weapons of our warfare not of the flesh
but divinely powerful for the destruction of fortresses
We are destroying speculations
AND every lofty thing raised up against the knowledge of God
AND we are taking every thought captive to the obedience of Christ
AND we are ready to punish all disobedience
Whenever your obedience is complete
Pulling down of fortresses
One commentator writes, “The stronghold (or fortress) is the place where the devil and his forces are entrenched”. This isn’t too farfetched, I don’t think. Exactly what are we fighting? The New Testament is very clear that we are at war against dark forces. There is no way to demythologize it and still take the New Testament seriously.
Assuming we are at war, then we need to take the NT’s language seriously. It says part of our life as disciples is to attack strongholds. And this raises the question: “What’s the point of a fortress or stronghold?”
The Method of our Attack
If we are indeed called to pull down strongholds and fortresses, and we know that Paul doesn’t mean that against literal flesh-and-blood enemies, then we have to ask, “What will this attack look like?”
- Truth encounter (every lofty thing raised up against the knowledge of God)
- The Greek word for lofty thing is “hypsoma.” It means something like astrological ideas, cosmic powers, and power directed against God.
- Victory encounter (taking every thought captive)
How do you get a promise?
[1]
You can only get promises by means of words. Not pictures. Not adiaphora.
[2]
God also gives promises in bread and wine.
[3]
But you would only know that through Words.
[4]
We pray to the One who attaches promises to prayers.
[5]
How many times to the saints attach promises to prayers to them? Mary? Angels?
[6]
How many times does Jesus attach a promise?
You can only get promises by means of words. Not pictures. Not adiaphora.
[2]
God also gives promises in bread and wine.
[3]
But you would only know that through Words.
[4]
We pray to the One who attaches promises to prayers.
[5]
How many times to the saints attach promises to prayers to them? Mary? Angels?
[6]
How many times does Jesus attach a promise?
John of Damascus: Prolegomena
I read through Damascene's On the Orthodox Faith in 2009. At the time I had hyper-Palamite lenses on and really didn't let Damascene speak for himself. I am rereading him now, years and paradigms later. He's really quite interesting. Contrary to the neo-Palamite Orthodox today, he isn't afraid of "rationality" or using proofs for God's existence. In fact, he sounds VERY Aristotelian. To be fair, he does anticipate later Orthodox mysticism by calling God "hyper-ousia" (I.4).
Existence and Nature of God
He does use Scripture and does allude to the Fathers, but the main thrust of his argument is natural theology. His argument for God's existence is as follows:
(1) All things that exist are either created or uncreated.
(2) If created, then mutable and subject to change and perishing
(3) But things that are created must be the work of some Maker
Damascene anticipates the infinite regress rebuttal and handles it in an amusing (if not entirely convincing manner)
(4) "For if he had been created, he must have been created by someone, and so on until we arrive at something uncreated."
Perhaps not the most persuasive argument, but historically it is very telling. The holy fathers were not averse to using "logic," even logic apart from Scriptural and Patristic considerations, to prove points about God.
Damascene follows standard Patristic and classical usage in that the nature of God is incomprehensible.
(5) His essence is unknowable
How then can we speak about God? In what sounds like a later Palamite move, John says, "God does not show forth his nature, but the qualities of his nature" (1.4). Is this the same thing as saying "We can't know God's nature but only his energies"? Not quite. John does not use any of the cognates of energein.
A note on apophaticism
If we say, as John does, that God is not "darkness," but above darkness. Not light, but above light--why can't we carry it through and say "God is not love, but above love." God is not a, b...z. If God is above every reference point, then how can we truly predicate anything of him? We are no longer using analogous language but equivocal language.
Pre-Notes on the Word
He doesn't deal with Christology until Book 3 but he gives short comments here.
(6) God always possesses his Word, proceeding from and existing within Himself (I.6).
John reasons analogously from our words proceeding from our minds, and is not identical with mind but not separate from it, so the Word has its subsistence from God. Probably not the best analogy in the world.
(7) If a Word, then the force of the Word, which is the Spirit (1.7).
God and Being
(8) God is outside of being, yet the fountain of all being (I.8).
Along with this John gives the classic summary that God is one essence, one divinity, one power, one will, and one energy.
John then gives a classic summary of the Trinity, but I want to highlight one point:
(9) "Whenever we say God is the origin of and greater than the Son, we mean in respect of causation."
Here is the problem: Isn't a cause different in substance to an effect?
Back to Divine Attributes
(5*) Goodness et al belong to the nature but do not explain it.
What does that even mean?
(5') We do not apprehend the essence itself, but only the attributes of the essence.
Will this hold water?
Angelic Personalities
(10) Angels are not spatial entities, but a mental presence and energy.
This is quite interesting and is backed up by numerous accounts of spiritual warfare. An angel cannot be in more than one place at one time ("cannot energize two different places at the same time").
Existence and Nature of God
He does use Scripture and does allude to the Fathers, but the main thrust of his argument is natural theology. His argument for God's existence is as follows:
(1) All things that exist are either created or uncreated.
(2) If created, then mutable and subject to change and perishing
(3) But things that are created must be the work of some Maker
Damascene anticipates the infinite regress rebuttal and handles it in an amusing (if not entirely convincing manner)
(4) "For if he had been created, he must have been created by someone, and so on until we arrive at something uncreated."
Perhaps not the most persuasive argument, but historically it is very telling. The holy fathers were not averse to using "logic," even logic apart from Scriptural and Patristic considerations, to prove points about God.
Damascene follows standard Patristic and classical usage in that the nature of God is incomprehensible.
(5) His essence is unknowable
How then can we speak about God? In what sounds like a later Palamite move, John says, "God does not show forth his nature, but the qualities of his nature" (1.4). Is this the same thing as saying "We can't know God's nature but only his energies"? Not quite. John does not use any of the cognates of energein.
A note on apophaticism
If we say, as John does, that God is not "darkness," but above darkness. Not light, but above light--why can't we carry it through and say "God is not love, but above love." God is not a, b...z. If God is above every reference point, then how can we truly predicate anything of him? We are no longer using analogous language but equivocal language.
Pre-Notes on the Word
He doesn't deal with Christology until Book 3 but he gives short comments here.
(6) God always possesses his Word, proceeding from and existing within Himself (I.6).
John reasons analogously from our words proceeding from our minds, and is not identical with mind but not separate from it, so the Word has its subsistence from God. Probably not the best analogy in the world.
(7) If a Word, then the force of the Word, which is the Spirit (1.7).
God and Being
(8) God is outside of being, yet the fountain of all being (I.8).
Along with this John gives the classic summary that God is one essence, one divinity, one power, one will, and one energy.
John then gives a classic summary of the Trinity, but I want to highlight one point:
(9) "Whenever we say God is the origin of and greater than the Son, we mean in respect of causation."
Here is the problem: Isn't a cause different in substance to an effect?
Back to Divine Attributes
(5*) Goodness et al belong to the nature but do not explain it.
What does that even mean?
(5') We do not apprehend the essence itself, but only the attributes of the essence.
Will this hold water?
Angelic Personalities
(10) Angels are not spatial entities, but a mental presence and energy.
This is quite interesting and is backed up by numerous accounts of spiritual warfare. An angel cannot be in more than one place at one time ("cannot energize two different places at the same time").
Thursday, May 7, 2015
Read Between the Comments
Orthodox Bridge only approves about half of my comments, and the ones they do approve are always approved later and I rarely find the comments to them and it’s just so unwieldy. So I put them here. The paragraphs preceded by asterisks are those responding to me. My comments are in normal formatting.
***I’m interested to know what you are persuaded is the judge of truth?***
Better phrased: what is the *final* judge of truth? Before I answer that we need to get clear on the question. There can be numerous, subordinate, yet legitimate judges of truth (such as history, logic, the church–gasp!) which are not the final judge, which would be God’s Speech.
***I think this is what Robert is getting at when he points out the relative “novelty” of the Reformed tradition. Is this not your “judge of truth?” If it is not, are you the judge of truth? How many hard sciences and proofs need to converge for you to have faith in Christ’s work in the Church?***
I am not Reformed, but to continue with the question: yes, there is a subjective aspect to all of truth-judgments (not to truth itself). Everyone does it. You did it when you subjectively evaluated EO.
***You are right, antiquity IS NOT the only judge. But it seems that you are willing to be the ultimate judge of ANY evidence and .***
I am a subordinate judge of truth, as are we all. Otherwise, why bother?
***pick and choose what you’d like to acknowledge and dismiss based on it’ consistency with your worldview***
You would need to provide evidence.
***Nearly all of us here have been in your shoes. I certainly have. I understand where you are coming from. I used to walk into Orthodox Churches in Bulgaria and mutter under my breath, “pagans.” Then I’d go pick up Institutes and placate my own predilections.***
Please don’t patronize me. trust me, I’ve been there. I’ve spent years looking into this. I’ve lost friends forever because they thought I was leaving Protestantism. Even now, they refuse to talk to me.
***but my point is that many of us (Karen, Robert, me) have wrestled with the same cognitive dissonance you are and have had to challenge our own self will and our own limits to faith***
That is fideism.
***There comes a point when you must realize that the obstacle is not the evidence, but who it is you think is the proper judge of truth. If you reserve that right for yourself…so be it. But do so with full understanding of who and what it is you trust in.***
The mormon apologists I debated told me the same thing. Anyway, you made a decision based on your understanding of the relevant factors to enter EO. That is no different than what I am doing. You just don’t like my conclusions.
---------------
Hi John Doe
***Antiquity per se is not a particularly cogent epistemology. ***
Agreed. Otherwise the truth would belong to Hinduism.
***However, the Vincentian Canon is: that which was believed “everywhere, always, by everyone”.*
Vincent also thought the imputation and continuation of Adam’s Guilt was believed by everyone.
***We know that prayers to Mary were widely employed by Christians from India to Iberia in later centuries. That such an early prayer can be found lends credence to the belief that prayers to saints were part of the Apostolic deposit.***
Thank you. This is the classic example of affirming the consequent:
If this, then that.
That.
Therefore, this.
(THIS IS ORTHODOX APOLOGETICS’ FATAL MOMENT. HERE FALLS THEIR ENTIRE ARGUMENT FROM HISTORY. I HONESTLY FEEL LIKE I CAN CLAIM VICTORY)
***It also shows that the Church that determined the New Testament Canon also believed in petitioning the saints in prayer.***
What exactly are you trying to prove? If you mean that the “church” proximately determined the table of contents page in my Bible and *some* of these same guys also petitioned saints, then I don’t disagree.
If you take that proximate recognition as on the same level as God’s speech-act, and that those later witnesses (valuable fathers that they are) are on the same level as the Scriptural writers who warned not to burn incense to the Queen of Heaven, then I demur.
-------------
Hi Erik,
My moniker is that I believe in posting under my name. I’ve seen too many people “go crazy” under the protection of an anonymous avatar. See the Mark Driscoll fiasco.
***Does he who formulates a canon need to be infallible?***
No.
***In such case, how can you accept the Athanasian Canon of the New Testament? Athenasius believed in prayers to the saints, so by your reasoning, these are either licit, or his NT canon is not.***
One of my comments will surprise you. First of all, canonical discussions are far wider than Athanasius. Secondly, I believe the NT *canon*–formulated as canon–is fallible. The table of contents page in my bible is fallible and open to falsification. That has always been the Protestant position (though most Protestants have forgotten it).
------------------------
David and Erik,
My point RE Adam’s guilt is that Vincent is a two-edged sword. The very guy you guys go to for doctrinal unity taught something you do not believe and he said that was always taught by the church.
Vincent writes,
“Who ever before his monstrous disciple Cœlestius denied that the whole human race is involved in the guilt of Adam’s sin?”
24.62
***Do you seriously believe Robert is arguing that Antiquity is the SOLE judge of Truth?**
No, but it seems like antiquity is being asked to carry a lot of weight.
*** course, there is specific Scriptural verification for Holy Tradition, as I sketched quickly above, also referencing Robert’s excellent blog article above “The Biblical Case for Holy Tradition”.***
I’ve seen it. I believe it commits the affirming the consequent fallacy, but that’s probably not the most germane point at the moment.
**But the Reformed often ask for some confirmation from history for Orthodox practices & Holy Tradition. That’s what you have here. Historic confirma-tion of Holy Tradition. **
Sure, but historic confirmation (like all forms of belief) comes in degrees, and this is not the same thing as a quote from Paul saying burn incense to the Queen of Heaven.
***There are also Ecc. Councils confirming Holy Tradition by hundreds if not thousands of Bishops convocating in counsel with each other to specifically discern what the Holy Spirit has taught the Church in past centuries.***
Sure, but even those decisions do not begin to cover the gamut of doctrine and practice today, as any Old Believer or Old Calendarist will tell you.
***But this is not the case with Prayers to the Saints and Mary for intercession to her Son. You have just the opposite…a consistent pattern, practice and believe throughout the Church which is confirmed by Church Councils.***
Notice I am not disagreeing with you, per se. I am simply examining the belief. Earlier I said that belief comes in degrees (or is strong or weak in varying degrees). The earlier you get the less specific the belief is.
Karen says:
I’m convinced there is nothing humans do that is completely passive. None of us (even from birth) are a tabula rasa on which our experiences just imprint themselves. God installs some hardwiring there first that makes us active processors and decision-makers from the get-go.
J. B. Aitken says:Your comment is awaiting moderation.
May 7, 2015 at 12:22 pm
If I said stuff like that about you, my post wouldn’t be approved.
Yes, I understand how the brain works (interesting that you collapsed mind into brain), but I use “passive” in the sense of how 100.00% of studies on the brain use it.
Your comment is awaiting moderation.
*** you are implicitly honoring and “praying to Mary” (and all the Saints) as Orthodox understand this as well.***
that’s begging the question, but otherwise kind of you to say so.
***I’m not convinced if you were to pray to *God* in the sense you understand prayer to Mary, you wouldn’t also be sinning (at least potentially) to be quite honest***
I wouldn’t be, because God attaches a promise to prayers to him, so I can approach him by faith. Since there is no promise attached to prayers to Mary, I cannot approach that with faith–“anything not of faith is sin” and all.
***God is not a divine vending machine, nor a genie to grant our wishes. ***
While that is a straw man, almost all of the prayers in Scripture are petitionary.
***God knows what we need before we ask, so the real purpose of prayer must be to come to know God more fully and in the process come to also more genuinely know ourselves.***
That’s a nice sentiment but not germane to the discussion.
***You cannot worship God rightly in the sense of including everything which goes to make up a fully orthodox Christian corporate liturgy without including prayers to Mary and the Saints.***
Thank you. That finally answered my question.
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