How do you know? How do you know that you know? This is the problem of criterion, and far from being a technical point in epistemology, it is huge for theology and the life of the church. It runs like this:
How do we decide in any case whether we have knowledge in that case? What are the criteria of knowledge? (Moreland 2007, 123).
To risk a dangerous oversimplification, "How do we know that we know x?" Here is an example. If I tell someone that God gave me a word of knowledge, the cessationist will respond, "Yeah, but how do you know that was from God?"
If I say that I have the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit bearing witness that I am a child of God and destined for heaven, the anchorite will ask, "Yeah, but how do you know that without using your own subjective demon-inspired reason?"
It boils down to this: Before I can legitimately claim knowledge in these areas I must first satisfy the condition of knowing how I know. Seems fair enough and few people challenge this.
But there is a problem. Before I can know anything (say P, representing that I have the internum spiritum sanctum), I must know two other things: Q (my criterion for knowledge, which the critic seeks) and R (the fact that P satisfies Q). But there is no reason to stop here. One can now ask how I know Q and R, to which the new answer is Q' and R'. But now I have to give a reason for Q'' and R''. Further, I must now give a reason for Q''' and R'''.
Said another way: Before I can know, I must know how I know. Before I can know how I know, I must know how I know how I know. And on the nightmare goes.
Best just to dismiss the critic's question. But before that, let's give our own solution. We can start by knowing specific, clear items of knowledge. We can solve the problem of criterion by beginning with particular cases of knowledge and generalising to formulate a criterion for true belief. For example, while I know my faculty of reason can be faulty at times, I had to use the faculty of reason to write that sentence (assuming A = ~~A and that my terms meant what they meant). Using this reason I am able to read texts (and everyone will assume the text is clear at at least one level, otherwise why would you ever appeal to an opponent to read a text like 2 Peter 1:4?). This immediately falsifies the claim that I can't understand a text unless I am already in a community of text (no one seriously believes this when push comes to shove).
Moreland, J. P. Kingdom Triangle. Grand Rapids, Zondervan, 2007.
How do we decide in any case whether we have knowledge in that case? What are the criteria of knowledge? (Moreland 2007, 123).
To risk a dangerous oversimplification, "How do we know that we know x?" Here is an example. If I tell someone that God gave me a word of knowledge, the cessationist will respond, "Yeah, but how do you know that was from God?"
If I say that I have the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit bearing witness that I am a child of God and destined for heaven, the anchorite will ask, "Yeah, but how do you know that without using your own subjective demon-inspired reason?"
It boils down to this: Before I can legitimately claim knowledge in these areas I must first satisfy the condition of knowing how I know. Seems fair enough and few people challenge this.
But there is a problem. Before I can know anything (say P, representing that I have the internum spiritum sanctum), I must know two other things: Q (my criterion for knowledge, which the critic seeks) and R (the fact that P satisfies Q). But there is no reason to stop here. One can now ask how I know Q and R, to which the new answer is Q' and R'. But now I have to give a reason for Q'' and R''. Further, I must now give a reason for Q''' and R'''.
Said another way: Before I can know, I must know how I know. Before I can know how I know, I must know how I know how I know. And on the nightmare goes.
Best just to dismiss the critic's question. But before that, let's give our own solution. We can start by knowing specific, clear items of knowledge. We can solve the problem of criterion by beginning with particular cases of knowledge and generalising to formulate a criterion for true belief. For example, while I know my faculty of reason can be faulty at times, I had to use the faculty of reason to write that sentence (assuming A = ~~A and that my terms meant what they meant). Using this reason I am able to read texts (and everyone will assume the text is clear at at least one level, otherwise why would you ever appeal to an opponent to read a text like 2 Peter 1:4?). This immediately falsifies the claim that I can't understand a text unless I am already in a community of text (no one seriously believes this when push comes to shove).
Moreland, J. P. Kingdom Triangle. Grand Rapids, Zondervan, 2007.
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